基于模糊机会约束的博弈联盟收益
Payoff Function of Game Coalition Based on Fuzzy Chance Constraint
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摘要: 在模糊博弈环境下,研究联盟收益问题. 基于Tsurumi合作联盟概念,利用模糊变量刻画局中人参与联盟程度,拓展了模糊联盟概念. 针对博弈决策者在一定置信水平下极大化联盟收益的乐观值或极大化联盟收益的悲观值情形,引入模糊变量的可信性测度,建立了模糊联盟最优收益的模糊机会约束规划模型. 该模型反映了博弈偏好对模糊联盟整体收益的影响.Abstract: This article researches the payoff of game coalition under fuzzy game environment. Fuzzy variables were allowed to describe the rates of players participation to the fuzzy game coalition. A new concept of payoff function was proposed based on the fuzzy game concepts by Tsurumi. For the practical game problem that decision-makers will maximize the optimistic return or the pessimistic return at a predetermined confidence level, credibility measure of fuzzy variables were introduced. Moreover, a fuzzy chance-constrained programme model was built to seek the payoff of game coalition, which was the maximum optimistic return or pessimism return. The proposed model reflects that the payoff gained from fuzzy game coalition will more depend on players preference.
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